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Abstract 
 
The aspirations of a ‘new’ democratic South Africa which were realised after the April 1994 general elections marked a critical 
moment of freedom for the majority of the country’s citizens who were refused the right to vote by the apartheid government 
prior to 1994. Unshackled from centuries of colonialism and apartheid, the idea of a ‘new’ South Africa held within it the 
aspirations of freedom, dignity and equality. The April 1994 election and the others which followed later marked more than a 
simple transfer of power. Rather, they signified the moment of liberation and the final victory over racial oppression and 
subjugation. Almost 20 years since the first general elections in South Africa, the study traces the role played by the African 
National Congress (ANC) and its election campaigns which made it victorious from 1994 to 2014. It is argued in the study that 
key rituals in the performance of democracy and election campaigns are windows providing insight into a particular political, 
social and cultural milieu at a particular time. The study concludes by showing the ANC’s campaigning strategies over the past 
elections. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The year 2014 marks 20 years of South Africa’s democracy and the 180th anniversary of the official emancipation of the 
slaves in the Cape Colony. Therefore, the study foregrounds different perspectives on the 20-year rule of the ANC in 
South Africa by critically evaluating its election campaigning strategies. Differing in tenor, methodology and style, the 
study tackles various campaigning strategies as employed each time by the ANC prior to the elections over the past 20 
years. Furthermore, the study offers new angles towards understanding what has sustained the ANC over 20 years in 
winning the elections. It should be noted that in all its election campaigns, the ANC has emphasised the development of a 
‘people-centred and bottom-up’ campaign. Critically, this popular orientation was essential to the establishment of both 
national and international legitimacy for the ANC after the elections. The campaigns also sought to communicate a sense 
of the pre-ordination of an ANC victory. For the purpose of this study, the election campaigns of the ANC are divided into 
five phases, namely: phase one (1994); phase two (1999); phase three (2004); phase four (2009); phase five (2014). In 
all of these demarcated phases, the ANC won the elections and this could be attributed to its election campaigns. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Given the pivotal role of the ANC’s rule in South Africa spreading over approximately 20 years, scholarly articles and 
research material has been generated and published for some time, locally and internationally (Southall and Daniel, 
2008; Lissoni, 2012) As far as this is relevant to this research, the ANC’s election campaigns are viewed as having direct 
links to its continuous victories. Ironically, little has been researched about the ANC’s election campaigns over this period. 
For the purpose of this study, it is essential to explain how the above helped the ANC in achieving victory in all the 
elections that the party has contested since 1994. 
 
3. Research Design and Methodology 
 
As a qualitative researcher, the researcher is primarily interested in the election campaigns that enhanced the ANC’s 
victory in the elections since 1994. Consequently, what inform the success of the ANC in all these elections is highlighted 
in this study. Therefore, the primary aim of this study is to determine the extent to which election campaigns have 
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assisted the ANC in attaining victory in all the elections it has contested. The strategies as employed by the ANC in this 
regard were explored and viewed from a political liberalisation approach. The study identifies patterns in words and 
actions in the context of the elections to describe; analyse and interpret this phenomenon. This knowledge will add to an 
understanding of the dynamism of the ANC during the electioneering periods. Consequently, the study presents an 
interpretative synthesis of arguments and research data generated throughout the period of analysis. The aim is to 
explore the argument of sustainable and reliable campaigns resulting from the different phases of the elections over a 20-
year period. The researcher conducted research through direct involvement and observation of important ANC 
campaigning events, documentary analysis, interviews, consultation of secondary sources, and continuous media 
tracking. 
 
4. Discussion and Findings 
 
4.1 The significance and impact of campaigns 
 
Campaign events are a useful means for gauging a party’s intentions. Time is a limited resource on the campaign trail, 
particularly for the party leader. Party leaders can visit only a limited number of venues each day. Major party events (the 
launching of the party manifesto, the unveiling of lists, the celebration of holidays) occur only a few times during the 
campaign period. Thus, campaign events provide a window into the priorities of the party, an indication on which groups 
and regions a party is focusing (Ferree, 2011: p111). Like most of the political parties contesting the elections, the first 
feature of the election campaign was the fact that the election manifestos of the parties were, in essence, not all that 
different from one another. The ANC had to vigorously convince the electorate in all the elections from 1994 to 2014 of its 
relevance as the party of ‘choice’. During the election campaign of 1994, the ANC could be seen as the underdog; after 
existing for 82 years as a liberation movement, the party had not yet participated in an election and knew comparatively 
little about electioneering. According to Barnard (1994: p120) the main challenge facing the ANC was the change from a 
freedom movement to a political party, and this was no mean task. What follows in this study are the different phases of 
the ANC’s election campaigns: 
 
4.1.1 Phase One: Prior to the 1994 first general election 
 
The ANC’s election machine began to constitute itself in 1992 when it formalised an electoral commission (Lodge, 1994: 
p23). It is interesting to note that during the first phase of the election campaigns in 1994, the ANC realised that it was not 
strong enough, from an organisational point of view, to manage its entire campaign from party offices and using only 
party officials. Therefore, it was not unusual to see the ANC making use of outside organisations to assist in its 
campaigns. Consequently, during the first democratic elections of 1994 in South Africa, the ANC professionalised its 
campaign by employing Hunt Lascaris, and hiring as advisers, Frank Greer and Stanley Greenberg, organisers of US Bill 
Clinton’s successful 1992 presidential campaign (Bertelsen, 1996: p229). It did so while holding on to the ‘mass 
character’ of its appeal and its campaign. On the other hand, some of Mandela’s top lieutenants were learning to perfect 
their new roles as politicians under the tutelage of the Swedish Social Democrats (Barnard, 1994: p119). The outside 
companies/organisations without doubt played a vital role in giving the campaign a new dimension which was, in many 
ways, similar to a typical American presidential campaign (Barnard, 1994: p120). 
The electorate was beholden to the vision of a peaceful, free and democratic South Africa. The ANC went to the 
polls under the manifesto: ‘A better life for all ... working together for jobs, peace and freedom’ (Barnard, 1994: p119). 
The promise of a ‘better life’ had been informed by the policy orientations that the ANC espoused through the campaign. 
Housing, sanitation, education, peace, land, jobs and the like were the remedy to the social, economic and political 
dislocations that decades of apartheid rule had affected. Liberation from material deprivation was the salve for centuries 
of brutal oppression and exploitation (Ranchod, 2013: 90-91). Coupled with the above was the slogan ‘Ready to Govern’. 
The most eye-catching promise, and one calculated to win support from the ANC’s largely impoverished constituency 
was to build one million houses, provide running water to one million people and electrify 2.5 million urban and rural 
homes within the first five years of the new dispensation (Welsh, 2009: p540-541). 
Furthermore, with the aid of the above-mentioned foreign companies/organisations, the ANC launched one of the 
most scientifically correct election campaigns ever conducted in this country. In the first place the whole campaign 
centred on the person of Nelson Mandela. This was evident when, enhancing its image and campaign further, the ANC 
had a ‘postage paid coupon’ permitting non-attendees to write to Mandela directly, stipulating their ‘biggest concern’ and 
suggesting solutions to overcome this concern (Ranchod, 2013: p86). The above sentiments were also echoed by 
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Coetzer (1994: p260) when he stated: ‘The first democratic election of April 1994 in South Africa was a unique one, an 
election without voter’s rolls and without a similar election preceding it, which could act as barometer. Especially the black 
vote, but also the coloured and Indian vote, was an unknown and, at the same time, a crucial factor. It was an emotional 
liberation election in which the liberator, the ANC, would naturally get a big slice of the election cake. To cap everything, 
the party moreover, had the advantage that its leader, the liberating giant, Nelson Mandela, was widely admired locally 
and internationally’. 
To get their main product forcibly onto the election market, the ANC began to use a ‘roadshow’ reminiscent of 
American election campaigns. This process started with a triumphant ANC tour by train from Johannesburg to Soweto. In 
the ensuing months, roadshows, accompanied by the customary handshake, head-patting and smile, and by dancing 
drum majorettes, music and entertainment, plus a speech by Mandela, would become a common spectacle across the 
land. These actions enabled Mandela to become ‘one of the people’; the populace could literally see him, listen to him 
and even touch him. He was no longer the mystical figure who had spent 27 years removed from society (Barnard, 1994: 
p121). Johnson and Schlemmer (1996: p85) argue that it was imperative for the ANC to also make use of its reputable 
political leaders. Therefore, for its credibility, it was of considerable significance that the ANC had leaders regarded by the 
voters as people of political credibility. 
Welsh (2009: p540) states the following about the role played by Mandela in the election campaign of the ANC in 
1994: ‘The ANC’s biggest electoral asset was obviously Mandela, who campaigned tirelessly and pressed the flesh in a 
time-honoured fashion. His avoidance of demagoguery was conspicuous. His major strength lay in his ability to interact 
with ordinary people, rather than in formal meetings with set speeches’. One of the strongest points in the ANC’s election 
campaign was their argument that the National Party (NP) was carrying the ballast of the apartheid era with it. At every 
opportunity the ANC tried to discredit the NP. One other trump card for the ANC during the electioneering campaign prior 
to the 1994 general election was the use of People’s Forums. According to Ranchod (2013: p86) ‘the People’s Forums 
succeeded in giving the ANC a presence on the ground, making leaders accessible and generating the necessary 
momentum for the impending poll’. They were also part of a broader campaign ethic of engagement, interaction and 
participation. The above analysis of the election campaign by the ANC shows that the 1994 election was a moment of 
great celebration, signalling the arrival of full political equality in a single South African nation (Johnson, 2004: p210). 
 
4.1.2 Phase Two: Preparations for and the results of the 1999 elections 
 
When Mandela retired as president in 1999, Thabo Mbeki who had been the deputy president of the country and in 
charge of day-to-day government business during the Mandela era assumed the presidency. As his deputy president 
Mbeki chose Jacob Zuma, the former head of ANC Intelligence who had done a great deal to bring peace to KwaZulu-
Natal in the election run-up (Johnson, 2004: p220). It was again during this second phase of the elections in 1999 that the 
ANC continued to resort to negative campaigns. During the electioneering period, the ANC clearly attacked the 
Democratic Party’s (DP’s) ‘Fight Back’ slogan. In the Western Cape Province, for example, the party printed look-a-like 
posters but changed the wording to ‘Don’t Fight Blacks’. Although the ANC was ordered to take down its posters as they 
were deemed provocative, the move received extensive media coverage and became one of the most memorable 
moments in the entire campaign (Ferree, 2011: p103). 
 
4.1.2.1 Limiting the opposition parties’ access to the media 
 
According Butler (2009: p65) like the 1994 election campaign, the ANC had a strong presidential character and built up 
extensive analysis and opinion survey research. Furthermore, it also used sophisticated marketing and media techniques 
to differentiate its national from the more local campaigns. It was in the interest of the ANC to keep the temperature of the 
opposition parties as low as possible in order to starve them of media coverage. The ANC could rely on citizens’ limited 
knowledge of what opposition parties represented and why they should be deserving of attention. 
 
4.1.3 Phase Three: The second Mbeki era and the election campaigns of 2004 
 
Mbeki was re-elected to a second five-year term as South Africa’s president in 2004 with an increased share of the 
popular vote. In 2004 South Africa celebrated ten years of democracy, a process that was generally associated with 
stocktaking and renewed plans of action for policy implementation and transformation. The ANC secured a 69% majority 
in the national election, and won all nine provinces. 
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4.1.3.1 The role of the working class 
 
The ANC appeared to have been able to rely on its history as the liberation movement that in 1994 negotiated the end of 
apartheid. During the 2004 elections, no real political alternative was presented to the predominantly black working class 
majority, despite the dramatic growth of unemployment and social inequality in South Africa under the ANC rule. The 
trade union bureaucracy remained loyal to the ANC. 
 
4.1.3.2 The impact of the Presidential Izimbizo 
 
Twala (2008: p137) writes: ‘Imbizo, in its traditional form, has constituted an important aspect of the African political 
system for many centuries, including South Africa. It was only during the presidential term of Thabo Mbeki that the 
concept was revived to a position of importance in the contemporary lexicon and formal governance setting’. The ANC 
attempted to maintain its support by concentrating on local issues and holding ‘imbizos’ in the townships, addressed by 
the top leadership of the organisation. During such meetings, President Mbeki and his cabinet ministers visited the 
communities to canvass votes. In other attempts to galvanise more support, provincial izimbizos were also organized 
whereby the provincial leaders of the ANC would engage with the electorate. This strategy proved to be useful for the 
success of the ANC. 
 
4.1.3.3 The election posters 
 
One other aspect that helped the ANC to galvanise support was the use of the election posters to its benefit. In the 
posters, Mbeki as the leader of the ANC was glorified as the person with the power and the abilities to fulfil the 
organisation’s promises and voters’ expectations. Therefore, the photograph of the organisation’s leader was almost a 
form of personification. Furthermore, the basic need for water, food, and shelter were emphasised. On its posters, the 
ANC again propagated its old and well-known slogan ‘A better life for all’ coupled with ‘Vote ANC’. It had become a 
standard slogan since 1994. One poster had a smiling Mbeki presiding over the slogan, whereas another poster simply 
implored voters to vote ANC on 14 April (De Wet, 2004: p109-110). 
 
4.1.4 Phase Four: The pre-2009 electioneering campaign and the Polokwane fiasco 
 
Barely a year after Mbeki’s re-election as South Africa’s president in 2004, there came the first portent of a rebellion when 
a council of senior party members orchestrated a comeback for Jacob Zuma, following his dismissal earlier that year as 
deputy president of the country after allegations of corruption. According to Russell (2009: p76) ‘Mbekiites had hoped to 
finish him off politically once and for all by formalising his suspension as deputy head of the party. They failed. Instead, 
Zumaites took charge of the meeting and insisted that their man was fully reinstated’. Mbeki and his aides remained 
blithely confident that the party would not betray him. There had not been a fight over the party leadership since 1949, 
when Mandela and other young firebrands had ousted the party’s president, AB Xuma (Twala, 2009: p153-171). The 
above was an indication that while the party’s constitution provided for regular contested elections at all levels, its political 
culture, which stemmed from its long period as an outlawed resistance movement, had deterred internal competition, 
branding those who vied for office as selfish and overambitious. It was not until 2007, that the leadership contest took 
centre stage (Friedman, 2009: p109). 
Mbeki’s term was to have expired in April 2009, but many in the ANC felt that he needed to leave office sooner. 
Finally, in September 2008, Mbeki’s critics had a reason to fire him after Chris Nicholson, a High Court judge with good 
human rights credentials, had dismissed the corruption charges against Zuma on the basis of a technicality. The judge 
found that Zuma had had grounds to allege a political conspiracy against him, as the evidence before Nicholson was 
strong that Mbeki had meddled in his case (Louw, 2008: p1-2; Twala, 2009: p126-128).  
During the 2009 election campaign, the ANC’s slogan was ‘Working together we can do more’. The ANC revealed 
a renewed sense of urgency, with government intentions spelt out in action-driven language at a time when greater 
persuasion of voters was needed. The ANC leadership worked on countering negative publicity, as well as having to deal 
with the launch and campaign of the Congress of the People (COPE), and possible fallout through abstention. A sense of 
rebellion and pseudo-regime transition reinvigorated the campaign. The leadership often descended into communities in 
grand style in motorcades and helicopters. According to Booysen (2011: p109-110) ‘the party shone in mass rallies that 
hero worshipped the vibrant ANC that effectively resisted the forces of Mbeki’s ancient regime and resurrected the 
popular orientation and connection with the people’. 
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During the ANC election launch, Zuma stated: ‘South Africa will need a government with experience and political 
will, a government that fully understands what needs to be done to address our apartheid, and a government that puts 
people first and which works with the people. The ANC continues to be such a government. A vote for the ANC is a vote 
for a better life for all’ (Booysen, 2011: p110).  
 
4.1.4.1 The 2009 election campaign and the ethnicity card 
 
In the 2009 elections, the ANC managed to win 66% of the vote (Louw, 2009: p1-2). To a certain extent, Zuma’s 
‘Zuluness’ and his projection as the ‘leader of the people’ played a significant role in this regard. Although the ANC got 
into full swing with the usage of the concept of Zuluness in campaigning for votes when Zuma became President of the 
ANC after the Polokwane Conference in December 2007, Hoeane argues that as early as the June 1999 elections, the 
ANC had started using the concept in an attempt to garner support, but to a certain extent unsuccessfully (Hoeane 1999: 
p133-144).  
Twala (2010: p68) states the following about the Zuluness card played by Zuma during the 2009 elections: ‘Without 
doubt the Zulu card played by Zuma in appealing for votes from the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) electorate played a huge role in 
making the ANC win that province by 63%. Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) received 22% and the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
9.8%. The Zuluness issue raised questions about the role played ethnicity in contemporary politics and about its place in 
the process of consolidating democracy under the leadership of the ANC government’. 
 
4.1.4.2 The ANC’s appeal to traditional leaders 
 
Despite the issue of democratisation in South Africa since 1994, traditional leaders continue to wield more powers and 
have constituencies which could be exploited for political gains. Before Zuma was elected as President of the ANC he 
had gone out of his way to reach out to traditional leaders and chiefs (amakhosi), particularly in the KZN Province. Once 
he was elected the amakhosi felt they could relate to him. This stance also changed the perception that the ANC was a 
party for Xhosa-speaking people. In the several meetings held with amakhosi, Zuma portrayed himself as one of them. 
His latest close relationship with King Zwelithini paved the way for his easy access to the amakhosi in the region. This 
strategy of Zuma and playing the ethnicity card militated against the IFP’s doing well in KZN. By infiltrating the amakhosi, 
the ANC became aware that they were considered instrumental in how the rural populace voted and, through legislation, 
like KwaZulu-Natal’s Traditional Leadership and Governance Act, they now drew salaries, received pensions and 
qualified for houses from the provincial government (Twala, 2010: p74). 
 
4.1.4.3 The 2009 election manifesto 
 
From the first election of 1994, Bulter (2009: p72) argues that on the advice of American pollster Stanley Greenberg, the 
ANC presented the electorate with a wide-ranging, detailed but somewhat boring policy programme that signalled its 
seriousness and commitment to good government. The 2009 manifesto was a low-key document that mostly steered 
clear of controversial and ideologically divisive issues. It identified five key emphases: unemployment, particularly young 
people in rural areas; health, with a national health insurance system provided within five years; education; rural 
development; and crime and corruption. 
 
4.1.5 Phase Five: The 2014 election manifesto and the gains of 20 years as the government of South Africa 
 
Just few months before the ANC could seriously start with its election campaign for the 2014 general elections in South 
Africa, Mandela, the liberation icon who took the organisation to its first victory in 1994 against the NP, died on 5 
December 2013 after suffering from lung problems. The ANC 2014 election campaign has been marred by criticism of 
Zuma (the ANC’s President and that of the country). This challenge nearly compromised the organisation as the 
opposition parties capitalised on the Zuma issue, thus challenging the ANC. Some of the other challenges include the 
following: 
 
4.1.5.1 Nkandla Report: ANC election headache 
 
Without doubt, with the release of the Nkandla Report by the Public Protector Advocate, Thuli Madonsela ahead of the 
2014 elections, the ANC was concerned about the prospect of losing votes. The report implied that President Zuma knew 
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about the R 206 million which was tax-payers’ money used to upgrade his private home in Nkandla. As early as 
December 2013, the Secretary-General of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe demanded that the report be released ahead of 
the elections, and if not, could be interpreted as a clear ploy to discredit the ANC. Mantashe told journalists at the party’s 
headquarters in Luthuli House that: ‘She (Madonsela) must release the report. The sooner she does the better. If she 
keeps it until the eve of elections, we will suspect she is playing a political game. If it affects the president of the ANC it 
will impact the image of the ANC’ (Nhlabathi, 2013: p4).  
Addressing journalists on 9 January 2014 at Mbombela Stadium ahead of the launch of the ANC election 
manifesto, Mantashe further reiterated his view that if Madonsela failed to release the report before the elections, her 
conduct would be interpreted as political. He stated: ‘The Public Protector has been working on that report for a long time; 
we don’t expect her to take another six months. If the Public Protector releases it close to the elections, we will actually 
assume it will be intended to tilt the balance of forces in the election. It will be intended to muddy the waters in the 
election campaign’ (Pillay and Letsoalo, 2014: p2). 
Despite the Nkandla Report, the ANC continued to remind the electorate of two decades of its rule and 
achievements. Furthermore, the ANC leaders reminded the electorate who, before its rule were subjected to abject 
poverty and dehumanising conditions under apartheid, are able to cast their votes, have access to better education and 
work, access to water and electricity (Matlala 2014: p4). Booysen (2014: p12) argues the following ahead of the 2014 
elections: ‘... a Jacob Zuma-less ANC is predicted to enjoy better electoral fortunes than one under the captaincy of 
“Number One” himself. Turning around the top leadership of the ANC within the next few weeks will give the party a 
fighting chance of achieving a proud election victory, one without evidence of noxious slippage. It will signal that the ANC 
is serious about regenerating its power. It will build prospects of stable and focused government in the next five years’. 
 
4.1.5.2 The 2014 election manifesto and its appeal to the masses 
 
The ANC’s 2014 election manifesto entitled: ‘Together we can move South Africa Forward: 2014 Election Manifesto: A 
better life for all’ was said to be dedicated to the late Mandela. Like the 2009 manifesto, the 2014 one prioritises the 
following: the creation of more jobs, decent work and sustainable livelihoods for inclusive growth; rural development, land 
reform and food security; education; health; and fighting crime and corruption. Furthermore, the ANC prides itself on the 
following achievements in the past 20 years of its rule: the abolition of discriminatory laws; advancing the right of people 
to equality, to protection against racial, gender and other discrimination; and to the progressive realisation of access to 
the basic necessities of life. In most of its campaigns, the ANC reminded the masses about the legacy of Mandela. It was 
also interesting to note that other new political parties such as the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and Agang also 
claimed the legacy of Mandela in their election campaigns for 2014. On many occasions the ANC called such parties to 
order as Mandela was the ANC member until his death in December 2013. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In all the above elections, the ANC has been able to neutralise efforts by the opposition parties by running skilful 
campaigns, playing on the opposition parties’ missteps and weaknesses, and controlling the supply of high quality African 
politicians. As hard and as loudly as the opposition claimed to have transformed, the ANC claimed the opposite. This was 
done by blocking the opposition from changing its image, by keeping the opposition ‘white’. It is clear from this study that 
in all instances, the ANC’s election campaigns and manifestos were carefully crafted. They were based on survey results 
that revealed voter needs and expectations and related to specific issues and identities, history and images. They 
reflected how the ANC wanted the people to view the organisation. The campaigns were signified in the ANC’s policies 
which showed the combination of national conference resolutions and manifestos. Despite organisational upheavals, 
popular disappointments, and the manifold shortcomings of the ANC in government, the organisation remains largely 
electorally unchallenged. 
The electoral imbalances in the party system and the static and predictable nature of voting outcomes have raised 
concerns about the depth and quality of South Africa’s democracy. Concerns relate to the inability of elections to hold 
government accountable. With the victory of the ANC in almost all the elections since 1994, the party is able to take the 
citizenry’s vote for granted because it is not seriously threatened at the polls. 
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